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 THE TROUBLED BEGINNING OF THE 
INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT 
JAMES W. ELY, JR.* 
From the time of their origin, railroads had been subject to 
regulation by the states.  By the 1880s, however, there was broad 
agreement that piecemeal and inconsistent state controls were 
inadequate to deal with perceived difficulties and abuses arising from 
the interstate operations of railroads.  Yet there was little agreement 
about the nature of the “railway problem,” and still less any consensus 
as to how best to address the issue.  Translating the amorphous public 
wish for rail regulation into concrete legislation was not an easy task.  
After years of inconclusive debate, Congress passed the Interstate 
Commerce Act in 1887.1  Despite this important step, the early years 
reveal an Act that made little difference.  Congress itself waited nearly 
two decades to strengthen the powers granted to the Interstate 
Commerce Commission (“Commission” or “ICC”). 
An untidy compromise between quite different House and Senate 
bills, the Interstate Commerce Act was an amalgam of diverse and 
vague provisions.2  It created the ICC, the first important federal 
administrative agency, to oversee the Act.3  The five-member ICC had 
the authority to conduct hearings and issue orders to stop practices in 
violation of the statute.4  The Act declared that charges for interstate rail 
transportation should be “reasonable and just,”5 but did not define this 
term or give the ICC the power to set rates.  In addition, the Act banned 
rebates or preferential treatment for any shipper, and outlawed the 
pooling of traffic or earnings among carriers.6  The Act left unresolved a 
basic question: Was it intended to encourage competition among the 
carriers, or to stabilize the industry through cartelization?  As with any 
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novel measure, the effectiveness of the Act was open to question.  
Congress seemed primarily concerned to placate the public clamor to 
curb alleged railroad abuses, and was happy to leave unsettled policy 
issues to the ICC and the courts.  “The entry of the national government 
into the realm of railroad regulation,” historian Morton Keller aptly 
explained, “was a leap in the dark.”7 
The early years of the ICC present a tale of frustration.  The sheer 
size and complexity of the rail industry presented daunting challenges to 
the fledgling agency with its small staff.  Moreover, the states retained 
jurisdiction over intrastate transportation, and state regulation had the 
potential to undermine ICC policy.  The skepticism of the federal courts 
about administrative regulation of the economy also greatly contributed 
to the feeble nature of ICC supervision.  Both the Supreme Court and 
the lower federal courts consistently placed a narrow construction on 
the Commission’s authority.  Two developments are particularly 
revealing. 
First, the ICC had difficulty making its orders effective.  Lacking the 
power to compel obedience to its orders, the agency was required to 
seek judicial enforcement of its mandates when railroad companies 
ignored adverse directives.8  This step, of course, created opportunities 
for delay when carriers disobeyed the ICC.  More troublesome, 
however, was that federal courts from the outset refused to defer to 
agency findings of fact.  Instead, the federal courts decided that factual 
matters should be reviewed de novo, and permitted the introduction of 
further evidence by either party.9  The findings by the ICC were treated 
as a sort of preliminary report.  In ICC v. Alabama Midland Railway,10  
the Supreme Court affirmed this practice, ruling that the lower courts 
should give effect “to the findings of fact in the report of the 
Commission as prima facie evidence of the matters therein stated.”11  It 
added that the courts “are not restricted to the evidence adduced before 
the Commission, [but] additional evidence may be put in by either party, 
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and . . . the duty of the court is to decide, as a court of equity, upon the 
entire body of evidence.”12   
Second, the ICC had difficulty establishing just and reasonable rates.  
The regulation of railroad rates was one of the most vexing, contested, 
and misunderstood issues facing lawmakers in the late nineteenth 
century.  As common carriers, railroads had long been under an 
obligation to charge reasonable and nondiscriminatory prices.  But the 
common law also allowed the carriers considerable latitude in setting 
rates.  In the 1870s some states enacted so-called Granger laws, which 
empowered state commissions to prescribe maximum charges.13  
Congress, however, stopped short of giving the ICC such authority.  
Under the 1887 Act, the agency could review rates and set aside those 
deemed unreasonable, but not fix rates.  In time, however, the ICC 
asserted that the power to impose rates should be implied from the 
power to bar unreasonable rates. 
In ICC v. Cincinnati, New Orleans and Texas Pacific Railway,14 the 
Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice David Brewer, rejected this 
contention.15  It determined that, subject to the requirement that charges 
be reasonable and not discriminatory, the Interstate Commerce Act left 
the carriers free to adjust their rates to meet business conditions.16  In 
reaching this conclusion, the Court stressed the heavy investment in 
railroads and that rail transportation was carried on under diverse 
conditions in different parts of the country.17  Pointing out that 
administrative regulation of railroads was not new, the Court compared 
the language of the Act with that of state regulatory measures.  A 
number of state laws clearly granted railroad commissions the power to 
fix rates, but such authority was not expressly given by Congress to the 
ICC.  The authority to prescribe rates, the Court insisted, was “a power 
of supreme delicacy and importance,” and could not be implied from 
“doubtful or uncertain” language.18  The Court disapproved of what it 
saw as an agency grab for power.  The justices observed that “it would 
be strange if an administrative body could by any mere process of 
construction create for itself a power which Congress had not given to 
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it.”19  The Court left open, however, the possibility that Congress might 
confer ratemaking power on the ICC.  Until that happened with the 
Hepburn Act of 1906,20 the ICC was compelled to abandon its efforts to 
set rates for the carriers. 
By the early twentieth century, the ICC was largely toothless and 
spent much of its energy gathering statistics about the rail industry.  In 
1903 the ICC explained: “At present this Commission can investigate 
and report.  It has no power to determine what rate is reasonable, and 
such orders as it can make have no binding effect.”21  Nonetheless, the 
ICC served a vital political purpose.  It satisfied the popular clamor for 
governmental control of railroads, even if the supervision was largely 
nominal.22 
Although the Interstate Commerce Act was important as the 
prototype for subsequent regulatory measures by Congress, the early 
history of the Act is a study in unresolved problems.  Clearly the federal 
courts were dubious about an administrative body that was an uncertain 
fit in the constitutional system as traditionally understood.  The modern 
norm of a deferential attitude toward administrative bodies was not the 
prevailing judicial view in the late nineteenth century.  Indeed, implicit 
in the Supreme Court decisions narrowly construing the authority of the 
ICC was the premise that Congress, not the Commission, was the proper 
policymaking body.  The Supreme Court of the 1890s was disposed 
toward private economic ordering, but the responsibility for the feeble 
power of the ICC rests ultimately with Congress, not the Court.  It is far 
from clear that Congress was very serious about regulating the carriers.  
Revealingly, Congress appeared untroubled about Court rulings adverse 
to the ICC, and made no move to strengthen the agency for years.  In 
fact, the ICC remained passive for a decade after the 1897 decisions. 
 
 
19. Id. at 510. 
20. Ch. 3591, § 4, 34 Stat. 584, 589–90 (1906) (amending section 15 of the 1887 Act). 
21. 17 ICC ANN. REP. 17 (1903). 
22. Cf. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 339 (3d ed. 2005) 
(“Congress was only half-serious about taming the railroads; it was in deadly earnest only 
about public opinion.”). 
